What is d3a

Just like the Assessments Process FM , Nodal Analysis is methodical, measurement-dependent, persistent, graphical, logical and inquisitive. Nodal Analysis can help you determine cause-and-effect relationships within a system and isolate one subsystem or component at a time, repeating the nodal analysis for each subsystem or component until you uncover the source or root-cause of the problem.

If we conduct a Nodal Analysis to analyze the break-down between targeting and ISR, it points directly at our collective lack of conducting MDMP due to the complex adaptive systems the mission, the terrain, the populace and the enemy within the COE.

The answer here is simple, conduct MDMP and force every staff member to take an active part during the entire process. These issues and solutions are complex because it goes beyond just targeting and ISR.

Most importantly, our collection efforts must be expanded beyond just ISR and must include platforms from all Intel disciplines to gather information on the root-cause of the increase of extrajudicial killings so that BN commander can request for specific assistance from the RC commander, who in turn can request the appropriate assistance from ISAF, the embassy, an NGO, State Dept.

The answer is glaringly simple. We need to hit the reset button and go back to the fundamentals of staff work --conducting MDMP would be a great start. For years the "old" Army had a defined by MTOE Collection Manager handling ISR and fully understanding his doctrinal role --right now it is the last officer through the door that is assigned the position or the most junior officer and we have "forgotten" that there is still a very valid FM even though from which strangely if followed is exactly what now countless MTTs, and countless hand holding sessions still emphasize.

Why are we doing this? Why does our organization prefer information categorized, and what are the limitations to doing that versus a holistic appreciation? Doctrine and design are interwinedand if doctrine is not working not so sure design can work, if the target planning cycle is not working not sure ISR is working and vice versa, and if I do not understand my OE then how do I know the answer to why are the complex problem sets adapting faster than I am.

Thanks for your comments. Without invoking any new paradigm shifts or inciting a doctrinal holy war between the CoE's, I concur with your analysis and assessment of the issues at hand in regard to the ever widening gap between targeting and ISR planning and synchronization in support of Combat Operations.

It has been my experience while working at the SCIF that some of the problems persist because the Intel staff is often told "don't worry about it, we have civilian contractors in theater that will take care of those problems planning and synching ISR ". Naturally, the focus of the staff shifts to making sure that our equipment and soldiers get to theater. The problem with the planning and efficient integration of ISR assets to collect, analyze and disseminate information exists due to a lack of holding anyone accountable.

It is always someone else's fault or someone else's lane. Until we have accountability at every level the status quo remains. You rightly note that no one wants to be the 'bearer of bad news' so keeping the boss in the dark has evolved into an artform. Assumption is that doctrinally there are five integrated processes; IPB, targeting, ISR, composite risk assessment, and knowledge management.

The problem is not being "solved" a true solution is simply being pushed to a later date. In some aspects you are right it all does goes back to doctrine and if we do not know doctrine then even design fails. Fascinating information; it gives credibility to the old saying "the more things change, the more they remain the same".

I gave up going through the digital swamp and went to my own collection. On page Syllabus A. Title: Selection and Appreciation of Targets. The 6 questions are. I did find a National Park Service paper OSS camps were hidden in our National Park System, paper is about pages that leads me to believe that is when the change took place.

All the original OSS people went through the British system first but the OSS was not satisfied and complelty revamped the whole program right down to the physical training program.

One really interesting point was the OSS was tired of fooling with local populations and was going to go to two and three man "cells" deployed all over the world and would strike targets when orderd to with or without the knowledge or cooperation of the local populace Another thing this twitter-facebook revolution stuff ain't new by any means, they would have understood exactly what is happening today, they just didn't have cell phones back then.

The SOE book has an extensive section on propaganda and an exstensive section on "cell" organization and management. And yes it was Cops that helped them figure all this out! So there you go, you guys should be ready to Target a path to victory for others to follow. Bill M. Seem to be similar to the recent attack that just happened in Norway. Jimmy, we have obviously shared the same frustrations, so as brother President Clinton once famously said, "I feel your pain" Slap, sounds like a great find.

I'm envious of your research skills and look forward to seeing what you found. Still doing some reading I have found the actual trainig syllabus from WW2 but I can tell you this. It was a series of interrogative questions to be asked by the commander to help determine if he should attack the target the Decide step methods of attack ranged from passive resistance,minor sabotage,major sabotage,or Air or Naval stike depending upon location and means available.

HVI attacks fell under "subversion of troop morale". More later. Less is always better. Needless to say, it became a nightmare to keep track of all the values for thousands of targets across 24 Provinces and it led to many wasted hours arguing over 'the process' rather than focusing on the mission at hand.

Same targeting methods by differant means to strike them. Jimmy Gomez, don't leave town yet. I am wading through the digital swamp. In the mean time here is link to a paper that was up on the targeting thread but the link has died. It is by special Forces Major who so frustrated about the lack of tools to identify an Insurgent Infrstructure that he turned to LE techniques from the 's, especially flowcharting and it did not have anything to do with computers back then.

Here is the link. Later Slap. If there was a N in any column then the target wasn't doable, either we couldn't access it, recognize it, recuperability took too long or they could recover too quick etc. The targets that had all Y's were then debated to see which one or ones we wanted to hit and why.

The discussion was more valuable then subjectively assigning numbers. The senior NCOs loved it, our non-thinking officers couldn't stand it, because it actually required thinking and not relying a process and a pseudo math process to identify your target effectively taking personal responsibility out of the equation. Having used and briefed CARVER numerous times for actual and training missions, we always had to tweak the numbers to get the answer we knew was right.

It was an exercise in B. Targeting should be a process that involves logic and intuition. The force will continue to use numbers, because despite our claims of being adaptive we're very much regimented, both the conventional army and SF.

The biggest hurdle every unit must overcome is having a standardized value which is understood by every warfighting function and staff functional area, as well as the USMC, USAF and each agency in the AOR.

Add a Joint standardization of values and you have the premise for interagency-collaboration. Often times, SOF, the Task Force and the agency's LNOs walked out in frustration during the weekely high side update when the discussion turned into a regurgitation of what the differences in "accessibility" value of a particular individual between staff sections or between agencies, namely the PRT's.

It simply becomes discovery learning once in theater. By the time a functional process is in place, the replacement unit's torch party arrives. Is right. If it 's a conventional military formation, use D3A. Either way, your staff had better understand the process - the targeting cycle drives a collection management plan and the CM plan drives an ISR allocation process.

If you can't collect the necessary intel, neither targeting method will work well. These latest conflicts has taught us that a single commander should "own" all of the enablers that support the trgeting cycle and that rather than intel driving ops, many ops must be undertaken simply to generate intel.

Targeting HVIs alone has been proven to be ineffective at least the way we're doing it, which is a result of using as Slap stated , "satisfy some abstract rule system". As for the book killing Pablo, our guys are doing that and much more, but the problem set now is much more complicated than killing Pablo.

Hi Bill I know you are busy and probably didn't get a chance to read Killing Pablo. That's why I keep bringing it up In a few cases, such as for malignant melanoma and certain neuroendocrine tumors, the morphology histologic type is included in the category and codes.

For multiple neoplasms of the same site that are not contiguous, such as tumors in different quadrants of the same breast, codes for each site should be assigned. Malignant neoplasm of ectopic tissue Malignant neoplasms of ectopic tissue are to be coded to the site mentioned, e.

Type 2 Excludes benign pancreatic islet cell tumors D Cancel Report. Create a new account. Log In. Know what is D3A? Got another good explanation for D3A? Don't keep it to yourself! Add it HERE! Still can't find the acronym definition you were looking for? Use our Power Search technology to look for more unique definitions from across the web!

Search the web. Citation Use the citation options below to add these abbreviations to your bibliography.